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Recasting West Tankers in the deep water: how Gazprom and Recast Brussels I reconcile 
Brussels I with international arbitration 
Youseph Farah and Sara Hourani* 
Abstract 
The central argument which is advanced by this article is that, whilst there is no outright 
obligation in Brussels I which prevents parallel proceedings between a court action and 
arbitration between the same parties and concerning a similar cause of action, the revisions in 
the recast Brussels I, along with the Gazprom interpretation of key non-revised parts of 
Brussels I, do certainly provide improved support for international commercial arbitration. 
These do so by giving more scope to national courts to restrict Parallel Proceedings; through 
anti-suit injunctions issued by an arbitral tribunal; through finding parties taking parallel court 
action to be in breach of the arbitration agreement; and by giving primacy to the arbitral award 
where it is irreconcilable with a parallel court judgment. The authors particularly demonstrate 
that this is made possible because of a changed (diminished) role which is given to the principle 
of effectiveness of EU law (effet utile) post Gazprom and Brussels I. 
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A. Introduction 
The (recently revised) recast Brussels I Regulation is concerned with determining which EU 
Member States’ courts have jurisdiction over any given civil or commercial dispute falling 
within its scope; and also with the recognition and enforcement of judgments made in other 
Member States.1 This research is concerned with the impact of the Brussels I regime (and the 
principle of effectiveness underpinning it) in the context of international arbitration. More 
particularly, it is concerned with how the Brussels I regime and the associated EU effectiveness 
principle, affect the rights of courts in one Member State to seek to protect the integrity of 
international arbitration, by restricting the use of parallel (court) proceedings in the courts of 
other Member States [hereafter ‘parallel proceedings’].   
In order to understand the problem of parallel proceedings in an international context, 
consider the following example: Suppose a party brings proceedings in accordance with an 
arbitration agreement before an arbitral tribunal seated in France. This tribunal determines that 
the arbitration agreement is valid and therefore exercises jurisdiction over the merits of the 
dispute.2 However, in parallel, the other party to the dispute brings proceedings before an 
Italian court, proceedings which are (allegedly) in breach of an arbitration agreement; yet the 
Italian court rules that the arbitration agreement is not valid, and asserts jurisdiction on the 
merits of the claim. 3  These parallel (Italian court) proceedings arguably challenge the 
                                                          
1 The Recast Brussels I Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2012] OJ L351/1, which supersedes the original 
Brussels I Council Regulation No 44/2001 (EC) of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2001] OJ L12/1. 
2 Under the doctrine of competence-competence a tribunal can determine its jurisdiction. See 
Art 19 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985). 
3 Which is possible under Art II (3) of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, signed in New York on 10 June, 1958 (‘New York Convention ’). 
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autonomous choices of the parties who originally chose to agree to go exclusively to arbitration, 
though their occurrence is often the result of one party (disputant) contesting the validity of the 
agreement of the parties; a right which will be seen is preserved under most national laws and 
international documents on international commercial arbitration. In addition, considerable 
costs are generated by having the dispute heard in different fora. But now imagine that an 
English court is faced with two applications; one for the enforcement of the French arbitral 
award, and the other for the enforcement of the Italian court judgment. The arbitral award and 
the court judgment are now in conflict with one another. In such circumstances, given the 
emphasis in Brussels I on respect for court judgments in other Member States, and given the 
broader EU principle of effectiveness that Brussels I is supposed to support, it is quite possible 
that the English court will consider it necessary to give precedence to the Italian court judgment 
over the French arbitral award. Yet this would be in conflict with the national courts’ 
commitment to the enforcement mechanisms of the New York Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 4[hereafter ‘the New York Convention’], and 
would also make the EU legal order appear to be one that is not friendly to international 
commercial arbitration.  
This article is concerned with how we might resolve these conflicts. So, as indicated in 
the opening paragraph, it considers the extent to which the Brussels I regime and the associated 
EU effectiveness principle, really do affect the rights of courts in one Member State to protect 
the integrity of international arbitration, by restricting the use of parallel proceedings in the 
courts of other Member States. When the authors speak of ‘restricting’ the use of parallel 
proceedings, the most important measures the authors have in mind here are: anti-suit 
injunctions; upholding a decision of an arbitral body to the effect that the party taking parallel 
                                                          
4 Art V of the New York Convention does not allow a conflict with a court decision as a ground 
for refusal and recognition of an arbitral award.  
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court action is in breach of the arbitration agreement; and (in cases of irreconcilability between 
the arbitral award and a parallel court award), giving primacy to the arbitral award. These sorts 
of measures may be essential in order to protect international commercial arbitration from the 
procedural inefficiencies which may arise out of parallel proceedings, and which constitute a 
considerable threat to the success of international arbitration within the EU.  
Until the CJEU decision in Gazprom5, it appeared that the courts of Member States had 
limited scope to place such restrictions on parallel proceedings; that such restrictions were very 
likely to be in conflict with Brussels I and therefore in breach of the general principle of 
effectiveness of EU law.6 Moreover, prior work on Gazprom, whilst focusing on the newly 
discovered powers of the arbitral tribunal to order an anti-suit injunction, did not go into the 
wider implications of the decision when read in light of the recast Brussels I and on the impact 
it has on the principle of effectiveness of EU law. 7 This article is therefore timely and 
significant because it demonstrates that the impact of the principle of effectiveness on the 
interface between arbitration and Brussels I has diminished post Gazprom and recast Brussels 
I. The argument is that, while there is no outright obligation in Brussels I which prevents 
parallel proceedings, the revisions in recast Brussels I, along with the Gazprom interpretation 
of key non-revised parts of Brussels I, do certainly provide improved support for international 
commercial arbitration by giving more scope to national courts to restrict Parallel Proceedings, 
                                                          
5 Case C-536/13, Gazprom OAO v Lietuvos Respublika EU:C:2015:316. 
6 Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA and Generali Assicurazioni Generali SpA v West Tankers Inc. 
[2009] ECR I-00663. 
7  CP Ojiegbe, “From West Tankers to Gazprom: Anti-Suit Injunctions, Arbitral Anti-Suit 
Orders and the Brussels I Recast,” (2015) 11 Journal of Private International Law 267, 267-
268.  G Carducci, “Notes on the EUCJ’s ruling in Gazprom: West Tankers is Unaffected and 
Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by Arbitral Tribunals Are Not Governed by EU Regulation 
44/2001” (2016) 32 Arbitration International 111. See also E Storskrubb, “Gazprom OAO v 
Lietuvos Republika, A Victory for Arbitration?” (2016) 41 European Law Review 578, 586 
where the author acknowledges the diminished role of the principle of effectiveness in the 
context of an anti-suit injunction ordered by an arbitral tribunal.  
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in the ways stated above: through anti-suit injunctions issued by an arbitral tribunal; through 
finding parties taking parallel court action to be in breach of the arbitration agreement; and by 
giving primacy to the arbitral award where it is irreconcilable with a parallel court judgment.  
The article is structured as follows. Section B explains the importance of international 
commercial arbitration as a method of dispute resolution in the business community noting that 
it has become ‘the normal method of resolving disputes in international transactions.'8  It 
demonstrates how parallel (court) proceedings undermine arbitration’s efficiency of 
proceedings and its autonomous nature. Section C explains the juridical and philosophical 
underpinnings of the decision of West Tankers in the context of Brussels I in order to fully 
understand the CJEU’s reasoning in Gazprom discussed in section D. Sections D and E 
demonstrate the manner in which the reforms introduced by Gazprom and the recast Brussels 
I enhance the ability of national courts to support international commercial arbitration inter alia 
through restrictions on parallel proceedings.     
 
B. Introducing the threat posed by parallel proceedings to international arbitration 
International arbitration is very important for the resolution of international commercial 
disputes, because of the scope it provides for commercial parties to make autonomous choices 
as to how they will resolve those disputes. In a survey conducted in 2009, 63% of large EU-
based companies stated that they prefer arbitration over court litigation, and where they have a 
                                                          
8 E Gaillard and J Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 1999), 1.  Arbitration continues to enjoy its popularity 
as demonstrated by figures representing cases referred to institutional arbitration between 
2012-2016 among leading institutions, such as the ICC, LCIA, SIAC and ICDR. See M 
Altenkirch and J Frohloff, “International Arbitration Statistics 2016 – Busy Times for Arbitral 
Institutions” (June 2017) Global Arbitration News 
https://globalarbitrationnews.com/international-arbitration-statistics-2016-busy-times-for-
arbitral-institutions/ accessed on 16 January 2018.  
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choice they prefer to arbitrate in the EU.9 Under the doctrine of party autonomy,10 the duties, 
powers, and important aspects of the arbitral procedure are founded on the arbitration 
agreement. This agreement often includes a choice of institutional rules to govern the 
proceedings, rules that seek to optimise procedural efficiency, safeguard privacy, and resolve 
disputes informally.11 Furthermore: 
the choice of arbitration may affect the substantive rights of the parties, giving the 
arbitrators the right to act as amiables compositeurs, apply broadly equitable 
considerations, even a lex mercatoria which does not wholly reflect any national system 
of law.12   
International arbitration is also of very significant economic importance for the EU. It has been 
recognised judicially that it is in the EU’s ‘commercial interests’ that international arbitration 
is safeguarded. 13  The EU is home to the International Chamber of Commerce Court of 
Arbitration (Paris), the London Court of International Arbitration, the London Chartered 
Institute of Arbitrators, and dozens of other reputable arbitral institutions. In 2009, the 
arbitration industry within the EU was estimated to be worth 4 billion Euros, and that this figure 
                                                          
9 See Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment, Accompanying document to the 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast) 
(SEC/2010/1547 final), para 2.4.1.3. 
10  T Carbonneau, “The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration 
Agreements” (2003) 36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1189, 1193.  See also A 
Redfern and M Hunter et al, Redfern and Hunter on International Commercial Arbitration 
(Oxford University Press, 2009), Chapter 3. 
11 See Gaillard and Savage, supra n 8. 
12 Per Lord Hoffman in West Tankers Inc. v RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SPA and others, 
[2007] UKHL 4, 17. 
13 See the Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in Case C-190/89 Marc Rich & Co AG v 
Societa Italiana Impianti SpA [the Atlantic Emperor] [1991] ECR I-3855.  
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was set to rise. 14  Moreover, EU Member States are very commonly chosen as seats of 
international arbitration. 
In what ways do parallel proceedings threaten the success of international arbitration 
within the EU? Parallel proceedings occur for a number of reasons. The most common reason 
is where a party brings proceedings before a national court, (allegedly) in breach of an 
arbitration agreement. This is sometimes done in the genuine belief that the agreement to 
arbitrate is invalid, void, or inoperable. 15  However, unfortunately, sometimes parallel 
proceedings are brought in bad faith solely to delay the arbitral proceedings by taking 
advantage of slow national court procedures. 16  If these parallel proceedings prove to be 
lengthy, and arbitral proceedings have already commenced, this poses a serious threat to the 
efficiency of the arbitral proceedings, and also of course, hinders the aggrieved party’s access 
to an effective remedy.  This may in turn encourage parties to arbitrate their disputes in a place 
                                                          
14 See Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment, supra n 9, para 2.4.1.3. 
15 JP Fierens and B Volders, “Monetary Relief in Lieu of Anti-Suit Injunctions for Breach of 
Arbitration Agreements” (2012) 9 Revista Brasiliera De Arbitragem 92.  
16 See Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment, Accompanying document to the 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), 
supra n 9, para 2.4.1.1. See also R Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (Oxford 
University Press, 2015), para 16.39 where the grant of an anti-suit injunction in restraint of 
Parallel Proceedings is founded on preventing injustice to the claimant. This is often shown by 
pointing to unconscionable conduct by the respondent such as a breach of a contract, or abuse 
of the process of the English court or if conduct of the respondent is ‘otherwise vexatious or 
oppressive proceedings in breach of a contract (arbitration agreement) cannot be granted unless 
to prevent injustice’. See also ICC Commission Report: Decisions on Costs in International 
Arbitration (ICC Dispute Resolution Bulletin, 2015, Issue 2) 
https://www.iccgermany.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Content/Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit/Decisions
_on_Costs_in_International_Arbitration.pdf accessed on 21 December 2017, para 79(v). Cf 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (COM/2009/0174 final), para 3.4. 
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outside the EU which provides more ‘legal certainty about the arbitral proceedings’, making 
the EU less attractive as a seat of international arbitration.17  
Brussels I is the main EU instrument harmonising the jurisdiction of the courts and 
recognition of judgments in civil and commercial law matters. As we shall outline below, the 
relationship of Brussels I to arbitration is a complex one, but for present purposes it suffices to 
say that Brussels I does not offer an explicit solution to the problem of parallel proceedings.18 
Equally, there is no convincing solution to the problem of parallel proceedings under 
international law or documents. International law responds to the threat of parallel proceedings 
in Article II of the New York Convention, which requires the national court to stay proceedings 
brought in breach of an arbitration agreement unless the court finds that the arbitration 
agreement is void, voidable, inoperative or incapable of being performed.19  The qualification 
of the duty to stay, which is subject to the national law of the court seised of the parallel 
proceedings, has allowed too much scope for the national courts when deciding whether the 
arbitration agreement is formally or materially invalid. More often than not the assessment 
whether or not to stay could take a long period of time depending on the time it takes a national 
                                                          
17 Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment,  supra n 9, para 2.4.1.1. 
18 The system of the Brussels I Regulation, Council Regulation No 44/2001 (EC) of 22 Dec. 
2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, [2001] OJ L12/1, in Arts 27-29 (29-32 in the Recast) offers an explicit solution which 
reduces the risk of parallel proceedings before various courts of Member States (parallel court 
proceedings where arbitration is not involved) on similar or related causes of action involving 
the same parties (lis pendens). 
19 Art II of the New York Convention. 
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court to determine the validity of the arbitration agreement20, and whether or not the national 
court has a favourable attitude to international commercial arbitration.21  
Certain solutions to the problem of parallel proceedings have been introduced at 
national level.22 For example, English courts often issue an anti-suit injunction restraining a 
party from pursuing or continuing court proceedings brought in breach of a valid arbitration 
agreement.23 The problem, as we are about to see, is that in West Tankers24 the CJEU held that 
this use of an anti-suit injunction by the English courts offended the principle of effectiveness 
of EU law. Potentially this ruling could be extended to capture more situations than had been 
intended to by the CJEU. This risk was particularly relevant in the Gazprom decision. West 
Tankers had given the impression that EU law stands as an obstacle to Member States who 
seek to protect the system of international commercial arbitration.  
                                                          
20 Certain systems apply a prima facie review of the arbitration agreement, however, other 
systems apply a full review. Moreover, where a tribunal is constituted certain systems leave 
the assessment of the validity of the arbitration agreement to the arbitral tribunal utilising the 
doctrine of negative competence-competence. See Art 1448 of the French Code of Civil 
Procedure, Decree No. 2011-48 of 13 January 2011 which entered into force on 1 May 2011, 
Book IV of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP), Arts 1442 to 1527. 
21 In the Case of Allianz SpA, supra n 6, Italian procedural law demonstrated its inefficiency in 
dealing with the core question of whether the arbitrational agreement between the parties was 
valid. Moreover, Italian law does not recognise that a subrogated party is bound by an 
arbitration agreement included in the contract between the beneficiary and a third party, 
whereas the English court held the opposite view. See West Tankers, supra n 12. 
22 National law is relevant where the matter is deemed to fall outside the scope of Brussels I, 
insofar as it concerns proceedings involving a matter relating to arbitration. 
23 Anti-suit injunctions are equitable remedies mostly used as a procedural mechanism by 
common law courts in order to prohibit parties from pursuing court proceedings in breach of a 
choice of court or arbitration agreement. See Ojiegbe, supra n 7, 267-268 for a further 
discussion on this point. See also T Hartley, “The Brussels I Regulation and Arbitration” (2014) 
63 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 843.  
24 Allianz SpA, supra n 6. 
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C. The treatment of parallel proceedings under the system of Brussels I 
This section explains the juridical and philosophical underpinnings of Brussels I which become 
relevant when dealing with the interface between Brussels I and international arbitration and 
come to the fore in the problematic situations described above relating to parallel proceedings. 
This is key to properly understanding the reasoning in the Gazprom case, the revisions made 
by the recast Brussels I and the implications of both for improving the Member States’ ability 
to protect international arbitration from a potentially over-permissive application of the 
principle of effectiveness of EU law. 
 
1. The Early Years leading to West Tankers 
Brussels I is concerned with determining which courts (i.e. from which EU country) have 
jurisdiction over any given civil or commercial dispute, and with the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments made in other Member States. The only reference to arbitration in 
the text of the original Brussels I is in Article 1(2)(d), which simply states that ‘arbitration’ is 
excluded from its scope.25 The Jenard Report on the interpretation of the Brussels Convention 
explained that the exclusion of arbitration was intended to prevent an overlap between the 
Brussels Convention and treaty law on international commercial arbitration, particularly the 
New York Convention.26  
At the time leading to the accession of the UK to the Brussels Convention a committee 
led by Lord Kilbrandon advised that the exclusion of arbitration from the Brussels Convention 
                                                          
25 The same was included in the Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters OJ L 299, 31/12/1972 P. 0032-0042, which was the 
predecessor of the Brussels I Regulation. 
26 Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, Signed at Brussels, 27 September 1968 prepared by P Jenard (OJ 1979 
C 59/1), 13. 
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“should be understood in the widest sense.”27 The meaning of “widest sense” was later fleshed 
out by the UK representatives to include “all disputes which the parties had effectively agreed 
should be settled by arbitration, including any secondary disputes connected with the agreed 
arbitration.”28 However, the original Member States of the EU understood the exclusion to only 
include court proceedings in a Member State concerning arbitration, whether concluded, in 
progress or yet to be begun.29  
The Schlosser Report stressed that the term ‘arbitration’ under Article 1 could not 
extend to every dispute that was affected by an arbitration agreement.30 The report drew a 
distinction between proceedings which were directly concerned with arbitration and 
proceedings which only incidentally concerned arbitration. Proceedings which were directly 
concerned with arbitration as the principal issue (e.g. the establishment of the tribunal, 
annulment or the recognition of the validity or defectiveness of an award) were outside the 
scope of the Brussels Convention. But where arbitration arose as an incidental question, eg the 
verification of the validity of an arbitration agreement which was relied on by a litigant in order 
to contest the jurisdiction of the court before which he was being sued pursuant to the Brussels 
Convention, the litigation fell within the scope of the Convention.31 
In Marc Rich & Co. v. Societa Italiana Impianti,32 the CJEU ruled that when deciding 
whether proceedings fall outside the scope of the Regulation, reference must be made solely to 
the subject matter of the dispute. Where the subject matter of the dispute falls outside the scope 
                                                          
27 Ibid.  
28 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in West Tankers, EU:C:2008:466, para 39, citing the 
Schlosser Report, infra n 31 at para 61. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Report on the 1978 Accession Convention to the Brussels Convention by Professor Peter 
Schlosser (OJ 1979 C 59/71), para 62.  
31 See also the Evrigenis and Kerameus Report on the Accession of the Hellenic Republic to 
the Community Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (OJ 1986 C298/1), para 35. 
32 Case C-190/89 [1991] ECR I-3855. 
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of the Regulation, such as a dispute concerning the appointment of an arbitrator, or a 
declaration regarding the question of the validity of the arbitration agreement, the exclusion 
from the scope of Brussels I in Article 1(2)(d) applies. Another important decision by the CJEU 
on the scope of Article 1(2)(d) was the Van Uden Maritime v. Deco-Line33 decision regarding 
provisional measures that concerned the relationship between Article 1(2)(d) and Article 31 of 
Brussels I. Relying on the reasoning in Marc Rich the Court decided that Article 24 may confer 
jurisdiction on the court hearing an application for a provisional measure despite the fact that 
proceedings had commenced on the substance of the case before an  arbitral tribunal (in 
arbitration).34  
The above restrictive application of Article 1(2)(d) allows the Regulation to engage 
even in situations where the parties had exclusively agreed to resolve the dispute by arbitration. 
One important repercussion of this engagement is that it brings into operation the principles of 
‘mutual trust’, and ‘effectiveness of EU law’. Mutual trust prohibits a court of a Member State 
from assessing the appropriateness of bringing proceedings before a court of another Member 
State which is seised of proceedings under Brussels I.35 Observing the principle of mutual trust 
is important because it respects Member States’ courts’ sovereign power to determine their 
own jurisdiction.36 The principle of effectiveness of EU law means that any national legal 
provision or any legislative, administrative or judicial practice which might obstruct an 
                                                          
33 Case C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime v. Deco-Line [1998] ECR I-7091. 
34 Ibid, para 34. 
35 See Case C-159/02, Turner v Grovit, Harada Ltd and Changepoint SA EU:C:2004:228, paras 
28-29. It requires for example a court of a Member State not to issue an anti-suit injunction to 
prevent parallel proceedings in another Member State, but rather to trust a court of another 
Member State seised of parallel proceedings to stay or decline proceedings should the 
proceedings before it be brought in breach of a valid arbitration agreement. See Allianz SpA 
and Generali Assicurazioni Generali SpA v West Tankers Inc supra n 6, para 19. See full 
discussion of West Tankers in section C2 below. 
36 European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department: Citizens’ 
Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Possibility and terms for applying Brussels I Regulation 
(recast) to extra-European disputes, PE [2014], 13. 
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effective application of EU law and prevent it from being implemented in its entirety is contrary 
to EU law.37  
The side effect of the application of such principles is that in successive CJEU decisions 
they stood in the way of national measures aimed at preventing parallel proceedings. Gasser v 
Misat,38 for example, involved an Italian party which started proceedings in Italy in breach of 
an exclusive forum selection agreement conferring jurisdiction on the Austrian courts. There 
was a reasonable suspicion that the proceedings had been primarily motivated by dilatory 
tactics before the Italian court. The court decided that it would be contrary to the principles of 
mutual trust and certainty of proceedings to allow a court of a Member State to ignore the lis 
pendens provision simply because the court first seised was either seised mainly for dilatory 
tactics by a debtor, or because the duration of proceedings in the seised forum were excessively 
long.39   In Turner v Grovit an anti-suit injunction was issued by the English court in protection 
of English court proceedings (as opposed to arbitral proceedings in West Tankers) ordering a 
party to stop proceedings before the Spanish court. The CJEU found that such an injunction 
would limit the application of Brussels I, and would therefore impair its effectiveness.40  
 
2. West Tankers bringing to the fore the principles of ‘mutual trust’ and ‘effectiveness of 
EU law’. 
In West Tankers, where the legality of an anti-suit injunction issued by the English High Court 
in restraint of Italian court proceedings brought (allegedly) in breach of an arbitration 
                                                          
37 See Case 106/77, Simmenthal [1978] ECR 829. 
38 Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT srl EU:C:2003:657. 
39 Ibid, paras 68-69. 
40 Turner v Grovit, supra n 35, para 29. 
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agreement was concerned, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom made a preliminary 
reference to the CJEU asking whether: 
it is incompatible with Regulation No 44/2001 for a court of a Member State to make 
an order to restrain a person from commencing or continuing proceedings before the 
courts of another Member State on the ground that such proceedings would be contrary 
to an arbitration agreement, even though Article 1(2)(d) of the Regulation excludes 
arbitration from the scope thereof.41 
Advocate General Kokott stressed that the use of an anti-suit injunction undermines the 
underlying principle of trust and confidence which is important to the system of Brussels I, and 
is contrary to the general principle that every court seised itself determines whether it has 
jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. At the core of the AG’s opinion was that anti-suit injunctions 
are contrary to the principle of effective judicial protection which is so essential to the EU 
internal market and the system of Brussels I.42  Whilst acknowledging that in exceptional 
circumstances preserving the principle of effectiveness would inevitably lead to parallel 
proceedings, the AG expressed her trust in national courts, stating that if an arbitration 
agreement is invalid there will be no reason why a national court would not stay proceedings 
and refer the parties to arbitration in accordance with Article II of the New York Convention, 
which all Member States are parties to.43 The problem with this analysis is that the efficiency 
of the proceedings could fall hostage to a slow tactical litigation in a national civil justice 
                                                          
41 Allianz SpA, supra n 6, para 19. 
42 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, supra n 28, para 58.  
43 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, supra n 28, para 73. In relation to the principle of 
mutual trust see Gasser, supra n 38. Gasser was criticised for having a formalistic approach 
favouring adherence to Brussels I over considerations of procedural justice, see eg R Fentiman, 
“Access to Justice and Parallel Proceedings in Europe” (2004) 36 Cambridge Law Journal 261, 
314.  
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system that permits such litigation therefore potentially compromising the efficiency values 
that the New York Convention and Brussels I promote in the first place.  
The AG’s opinion was endorsed by the CJEU. The Court relied on Marc Rich & Co. v. 
Societa Italiana Impianti 44  and treated the assessment of the validity of the arbitration 
agreement as a matter incidental to the main proceedings which fell within the scope of 
Brussels I. Consequently, the assessment of the validity of the arbitration agreement fell within 
the scope of Brussels I.45  The CJEU then ruled that the use of an anti-suit injunction ‘would 
amount to stripping that court of the power to rule on its own jurisdiction’.46 It can be argued 
that according to this reasoning such a measure would undermine the ‘trust’ between Member 
States in the Brussels I system, depriving a party from access to a judicial remedy.47 The CJEU 
reasoned that the anti-suit injunction was in conflict with the principle of effectiveness of EU 
law.  
Therefore, the principle of effectiveness of EU law has the potential to stand in the way 
of a Member State’s ability to control parallel proceedings. In West Tankers the threat resided 
in its elusive nature and the misleading impression which was left by the court that the principle 
of effectiveness of EU law calls for a rigid application. This was partially caused by the lack 
of appreciation by the court of the implications that the principle may have on future use of 
national measures aimed at restraining parallel proceedings, and by the brief analysis of the 
principle and its implication to measures that go beyond the legality of anti-suit injunctions.  
For this reason, the next section will explore in more details the principle of effectiveness and 
to explain its limits under the EU constitutional order, and the reforms which were brought by 
recast Brussels I. 
                                                          
44  Supra n 32. 
45 Marc Rich, supra n 32 and Allianz SpA, supra n 6, paras 23 and 24. See also T Raphael, The 
Anti-Suit Injunction Updating Supplement (Oxford University Press, 2010), para 12.06. 
46 Allianz SpA, supra n 6, para 28. 
47 For example see recitals 1,3,16 and 17 of the Brussels I Regulation, supra n 18. 
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(a) The principle of effectiveness of EU Law in the context of West Tankers and Brussels I: 
It was held in West Tankers that the imposition of an anti-suit injunction would undermine the 
principle of effectiveness of EU law, more specifically it would undermine the Brussels I 
Regulation.48 The Court held that the anti-suit injunction issued by a Member State court would 
deny a party access to a judicial remedy.49 The CJEU reasoned that the anti-suit injunction 
prevented the respondent from commencing and continuing litigation proceedings before the 
Tribunale di Siracusa.50 This in turn prevented the party from being able to benefit from an 
adequate protection of its rights of access to a remedy through the engagement of Article 5(3) 
of the Brussels I Regulation.51 By ordering a party to stop proceedings before a court of a 
Member State,  the anti-suit injunction challenged the Italian court’s freedom to determine its 
own jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of the Brussels I Regulation.52  According 
to the CJEU, this also undermined the ‘trust’ between Member States that is fundamental to 
the current system of the Brussels I Regulation.53  
                                                          
48 Allianz SpA, supra n 6, para 24. 
49  Ibid, paras 28-31. Y Farah and S Hourani, “Frustrated at the Interface between Court 
Litigation and Arbitration? Don’t Blame it on Brussels I! Finding Reason in the Decision of 
West Tankers, and the Recast Brussels I ” in P Stone and Y Farah (eds), A Research Handbook 
on EU Private International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015) 134. 
50 Allianz SpA, supra n 6, para 31. 
51 Y Farah and S Hourani, supra n 49, 136. 
52 Sir A Clarke, “The Differing Approach to Commercial Litigation in the European Court of 
Justice and the Courts of England and Wales” (2007) European Business Law Review 101, 
115-119 in P Santomauro, “Sense and Sensibility: Reviewing West Tankers and Dealing with 
its Implications in the Wake of the Reform of EC Regulation 44/2001” (2010) 6 Journal of 
Private International Law 281, 293. 
53 Allianz SpA, supra n 6, para 30.  
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It is important therefore to understand the meaning and limits of the principle of 
effectiveness of EU law. The principle of effectiveness is a fundamental aspect of EU law.54 It 
is used by the CJEU as a rule for the interpretation of EU law.55 It was emphasised as a 
constitutional principle of EU law in the case of Factortame I as a way of establishing a more 
effective application of EU rights by the national courts.56 The Court held in this case that any 
national legal provision or any legislative, administrative or judicial practice which might 
obstruct an effective application of EU law and prevent it from being implemented in its 
entirety was contrary to EU law.57 The CJEU established the importance of the principle of 
effectiveness in this case as it allowed for the protection of the right to judicial redress available 
under EU law. This protection would thereafter apply as a general obligation for courts of 
Member States to give adequate effect to EU law in their decision making.58 
The main function of the principle of effectiveness is to impose an obligation upon the 
national courts of Member States to give adequate effect to the rights and duties imposed by 
EU law.59 This means that national courts in the EU should give priority to the application of 
EU law, its purpose and objectives, by not making the enforcement of EU rights and remedies 
impossible or excessively difficult.60 More particularly, the courts must give effect to the 
purpose and objectives of EU legislative texts through the application of this constitutional 
                                                          
54 P Craig and G De Búrca, “EU Law: text, cases, and materials”, (Oxford University Press, 
2011) 218. 
55 S Mayr, “Putting a Leash on the Court of Justice? Preconceptions in National Methodology 
v Effet Utile as a Meta-Rule” (Autumn/Winter 2012/13) 5 European Journal of Legal Studies 
8, 11. 
56Case-C-213/89, R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and Others 
[1990] ECR I-2433. 
57 See also Case 106/77, Simmenthal [1978] ECR 829. 
58 Craig and De Búrca, supra n 54, 218. 
59 Ibid, 218.  
60 See C Mak, “Rights and Remedies: Article 47 EUCFR and Effective Judicial Protection in 
European Private Law Matters”, in H Micklitz (ed), Private Law Collected Courses EUI 
Summer School ‘The Constitutionalization of European Private Law’ (Oxford University 
Press, 2014). 
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principle.61 Consequently, if no EU law rights and remedies are at stake this principle would 
not be applied by the national Member State courts.  
Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights confirms the principle of 
effectiveness of EU law. The Article provides that: 
everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated 
has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions 
laid down in this Article. 
The CJEU uses this proposition as a foundation for the application of the principle.62 Therefore, 
the principle of effectiveness allows for an effective protection of individuals’ EU rights and 
remedies. The constitutional value of the principle of effectiveness is said to be enshrined in 
Article 19(1) of the TEU which provides that ‘Member States shall provide remedies sufficient 
to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law’.63  
The right of access to remedies under EU law is closely linked with the right of access 
to justice as it would not be possible to have such a right without adequate access to justice.64 
The CJEU places an emphasis on the right of access to justice and securing adequate remedies 
arising from EU law, as can be seen from cases such as Heylens,65Tele266 and Mono Car 
                                                          
61 Mayr, supra n 55, 11. 
62 Craig and De Búrca, supra n 54, 218. For example, see Cases C-317/08, 318/08 and 320/08, 
Rosalba Alassini and others [2010] ECR I-02213. 
63 See T Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law (OUP, eighth edition, 2014), 145. 
64 See Mak, supra n 60. 
65 Case 222/86 UNECTEF v Heylens [1987] ECR 4097. 
66 Case C-426/05 Tele2 Telecommunication GmbH v Telekom-Control-Kommission [2008] 
ECR I-68. 
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Styling.67 The CJEU held in these cases that the right of access to justice was crucial for the 
enforcement of EU law rights.68 
To sum up, the idea of the referral to arbitration by the anti-suit injunction was not in 
itself an obstacle to the party’s right of access to justice in West Tankers.69 It was rather the 
denial of access to the remedies found under the Brussels I Regulation that was problematic.70 
The principle of effectiveness affected the English court’s ability to protect the integrity of 
international arbitration proceedings as it restricted it from issuing an anti-suit injunction 
against the court of another Member State. It was considered by the CJEU that such an anti-
suit injunction would pose a threat to the unification of judgments within the EU.71 According 
to this line of argument, such a threat would undermine the effectiveness of the Brussels I 
Regulation in reaching its objective of creating a unified internal market that consists of free 
movement of court decisions allowing for legal protection and certainty.72 Thus, not applying 
the principle of effectiveness of EU law in the context of the West Tankers case would have 
meant that the party would have been deprived from having access to the remedy of the Italian 
court and not gaining the fundamental legal protection it was entitled to. 
(b) The limits of the principle of effectiveness of EU Law in the context of parallel proceedings 
It is important not to exaggerate the influence of the principle of effectiveness in the context of 
conflicts between arbitration and court litigation. It is established law under the CJEU 
jurisprudence that the principle of effectiveness, which was originally founded on allowing 
                                                          
67 Case C-12/08 Mono Car Styling SA, in liquidation v Dervis Odemis and Others [2009] ECR 
I-6653. 
68 Craig and De Búrca, supra n 54, 236-237. 
69 Farah and Hourani, supra n 49, 137. 
70 Ibid, 137. 
71 Allianz SpA, supra n 6, para 24. 
72 P Santomauro, supra n 52, 293. 
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some procedural autonomy to Member States, is not an absolute principle.73 It goes without 
saying that EU law must be engaged, directly, or indirectly, before one is able to argue that a 
national measure obstructs the effectiveness of EU law. In West Tankers EU law was engaged 
by the fact that the party would have been hindered in accessing a judicial remedy in Italy if 
the Italian courts did not have jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation to determine whether 
the arbitration agreement was valid.74 
Even where EU law is not engaged, cases suggest that the determination of the 
compatibility of a national procedural rule with the principle of effectiveness, such as that in 
West Tankers, depends on the facts of each case.75  Its application is subject to a test of 
proportionality, taking into consideration the purpose behind the offending national measure 
on the one hand and the restrictive effect of that measure on EU law on the other, bearing in 
mind the particular circumstances of the case.76 Much, therefore, depends on the objective(s) 
behind the national measure and the degree of effect it may have on the application of EU law. 
For example, the enforcement of a partial award declaring that a party will be entitled to an 
indemnity against damages awarded by a national court seised in parallel proceedings should 
not be deemed to be incompatible with the principle of effectiveness. This is reinforced by 
Article 73(2) of the Recast Brussels I which clearly gives precedence to the New York 
Convention, and therefore, the objective behind the offending national measure would be 
supportive of the policy considerations of Brussels I. The above discussion highlights the 
importance of the principle of effectiveness as well as its limits. In the next section it will be 
                                                          
73 Speech in February 2014 by M Safjan, President of a Chamber, CJEU, A Union of Effective 
Judicial Protection: Addressing a multi-level challenge through the lens of Article 47 of 
CFREU https://www.kcl.ac.uk/law/research/centres/european/Speech-KINGS-
COLLEGE.pdf accessed on 13 December 2016. 
74 See Allianz SpA, supra n 6, paras 29-31. 
75 Craig and De Búrca, supra n 54, 322. 
76 Ibid, 322. 
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demonstrated that the CJEU in Gazprom relaxed the application of the principle of mutual trust 
and effectiveness of EU law, and therefore provided improved support for national courts’ 
ability to restrict parallel proceedings. 
D. The Decision of the CJEU in Gazprom 
1. The Issue in Gazprom 
The basic background to the Gazprom case is that Lithuania, represented by the Lithuanian 
Ministry of Energy, made an application to the Vilniaus apygardos teismas (Regional Court, 
Vilnius) seeking initiation of an investigation in respect to the activities of the general manager 
of  Lietuvos dujos, a company formed under Lithuanian law, and in respect to a Mr Golubev 
and Mr Seleznev, Russian nationals who were appointed to its board of directors by Gazprom 
(a company formed in the Russian Federation). Gazprom held a 37.1% stake in Lietuvos dujos 
and Lithuania held 17.7%.77  
In August 2011, Gazprom filed a request for arbitration against the Ministry of Energy 
at the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce in accordance with the 
arbitration agreement which was contained in the shareholders’ agreement between Gazprom 
and the Lithuanian State. Responding to Gazprom, in an award of 31 July 2012, the arbitral 
tribunal declared that the arbitration clause contained in the shareholders’ agreement between 
the disputants had been partially breached and ordered the Ministry to withdraw or limit some 
of the claims which it had brought before that court. The Vilniaus apygardos teismas having 
considered that the investigation of the activities of a legal person fell within its jurisdiction, 
ordered in September 2012 that an investigation of the activities of Lietuvos dujos be initiated, 
which was followed by an appeal by Gazprom against that decision before the Court of Appeal 
of Lithuania. 
                                                          
77 Gazprom , supra n 5, para 12. 
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In separate proceedings, Gazprom applied to the Lithuanian Court of Appeal for 
recognition and enforcement in Lithuania of the arbitral award of 31 July 2012. The Court of 
Appeal refused Gazprom’s application holding that firstly, the arbitral tribunal which made the 
arbitral award could not rule on an issue already raised before and examined by the Vilniaus 
apygardos teismas, and that secondly, in ruling on that issue, the arbitral tribunal had not 
observed Article V(2)(a) of the New York Convention.78 Thirdly, the arbitral tribunal not only 
limited the Ministry’s capacity to bring proceedings before a Lithuanian court with a view to 
initiation of an investigation in respect of the activities of a legal person but also denied that 
national court the power which it possessed to determine whether it had jurisdiction. According 
to the Lithuanian Court of Appeal, to recognise the award would have violated Lithuania’s 
national sovereignty and thus its refusal was justified on public policy grounds available under 
Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention. 
In the appeal to the  Supreme Court of Lithuania, that court decided to stay proceedings 
and make a preliminary reference to the CJEU asking for a ruling on three questions: Firstly, 
whether a court of a Member State has the right to refuse to recognise an award issued by an 
arbitral tribunal prohibiting a party from bringing certain claims before the court of that 
Member State, which has the jurisdiction to hear the civil case as to the substance under 
Brussels I; Secondly, if the first question was to be answered in the affirmative, whether the 
same also applied where the anti-suit injunction issued by the arbitral tribunal orders a party to 
the proceedings to limit his claims in a case which is being heard in another Member State and 
the court of that Member State has jurisdiction to hear that case under the rules on jurisdiction 
under Brussels I. Finally, whether a national court, seeking to safeguard the primacy of EU law 
and the full effectiveness of Brussels I, can refuse to recognise an award if such an award 
                                                          
78 Supra n 3. 
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restricts the right of the national court to decide on its own jurisdiction and powers in a case 
which falls within the jurisdiction of Brussels I.79 
The CJEU chose to answer the questions together and treated the questions to mean in 
essence whether: 
Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as precluding a court of a Member State 
from recognising and enforcing, or from refusing to recognise and enforce, an arbitral 
award prohibiting a party from bringing certain claims before a court of that Member 
State.80 
The CJEU chose not to deal with the second question directly. If it had, this would have 
broadened the scope of its reasoning to include situations where the enforcement of the arbitral 
award would affect court proceedings occurring in a court of another Member State, e.g. a 
French court seised with a request to recognise and enforce an arbitral award ordering a party 
to refrain from pursuing court litigation before an Italian court exercising jurisdiction under 
Brussels I.     
2. The decision of the CJEU 
The main preliminary question in Gazprom was answered by the CJEU in the negative for two 
main reasons. Firstly, the CJEU reasoned that the anti-suit injunction was issued by an arbitral 
tribunal and not by a court of a Member State fell outside the scope of Brussels I under Article 
1(2)(d). 81  Secondly, the court distinguished the case from West Tankers because arbitral 
tribunals do not have the legal status of Member State courts despite sharing similarities in 
                                                          
79 Gazprom , supra n 5, para 26. The Lithuanian court contended that this injunction would 
restrict a national court’s right to determine its own jurisdiction to hear the case which would 
go against the concepts of safeguarding the primacy of EU law and the full effectiveness of the 
application of the Brussels I Regulation. 
80 Ibid, para 27.  
81 Ibid, para 36. 
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their roles as both issue binding decisions. 82  Therefore, neither the Swedish arbitration 
institution’s anti-suit order nor any decision of a Lithuanian court to recognise and enforce it 
conflicts with the principle of mutual trust.83 As a result enforcement of the anti-suit order 
would not be contrary to the principle of effectiveness of EU law and any other general 
principles of EU law.84  
 
The rationale behind the CJEU’s findings in Gazprom is not free from contention. 
According to the CJEU the anti-suit order in Gazprom which was issued by an arbitral tribunal 
has different effects to the anti-suit injunction that was issued by a court in the case of West 
Tankers.85 The CJEU held that the reason behind this difference is that the former type would 
still need to be recognised and enforced as an arbitral award by a national court and would be 
subject to the limitations on recognition and enforcement provided for by the New York 
Convention.86 Moreover, the CJEU stated that failure to comply with an anti-suit order issued 
by an arbitral tribunal by the party subject to that order (such as the one in Gazprom) does not 
lead to an imposition by a court of a Member State of a penalty on that party. Consequently 
this would not be the court of one Member State directly interfering with the jurisdiction of the 
court of another Member State.87 It would have been much more compelling had the court 
placed emphasis in its reasoning on the private nature of arbitration and perhaps resurrected 
some of the rationale which was advanced by the English decision in CMA CGM SA v Hyundai 
                                                          
82 Cp Ojiegbe supra n 7, 285 footnote 115; also see G Carducci, “Notes on the EUCJ’s ruling 
in Gazprom: West Tankers is Unaffected and Anti-Suit Injunctions Issued by Arbitral Tribunals 
Are Not Governed by EU Regulation 44/2001”, supra n 7, 9. 
83 See Gazprom OAO v Lietuvos Respublika, supra n 5, paras 29, 37 and 39. 
84 See ibid, para 33. 
85 See ibid, para 40. 
86 Ibid, para 38. 
87 See ibid. This was not the situation under West Tankers as can be seen from the CJEU’s 
statement in Gazprom, supra n 5, under para 33 that an anti-suit injunction issued by a court of 
a Member State against another one would be contrary to the general principle that each court 
has the right to determine its own jurisdiction as per Brussels I. 
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Mipo Dock Yard Co. Ltd,88 where in a sweeping statement Burton J held that arbitrators are not 
bound by the Brussels I Regulation. This reasoning by the court has been given further support 
by the reform in recital 12 of the recast Brussels I.  The implication of this reasoning is that 
arbitrators will be able to grant an anti-suit injunction in situations where an equivalent 
injunction by the court would be in breach of Brussels I.89 
Moreover, the above reasoning of the CJEU does not go well when considering some 
of the powers that are available to arbitral tribunals within the practice of international 
commercial arbitration. A party which breaches a tribunal’s order can still be found to be liable 
under normal civil liabilities, such as breach of the arbitration agreement, and all damages that 
arise out of that breach.  Moreover, there are points of similarity regarding the effects produced 
by an anti-suit injunction issued by an arbitral tribunal and one issued by a court of a Member 
State as both will have a de facto interference with the jurisdiction of another court of a Member 
State.90  Be that as it may, the CJEU sent a strong message that the type of interference 
experienced in Gazprom falls outside the constrictions placed by its previous decision in West 
Tankers. In this situation, the national courts (the Lithuanian courts) have to assess whether or 
not to enforce the arbitral award under the New York Convention.91 
                                                          
88 [2008] EWHC 2791 (Comm), [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep, 213. See also H Seriki, Injunctive Relief 
and International Arbitration (Informa Law, Routledge, 2014) para 5.12. 
89 Seriki, ibid, paras 5.11-5.13. 
90 See A Leandro, “Towards a New Interface Between Brussels I and Arbitration?” (2015) 6 
Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 188, 198. 
91 It is worthwhile noting that under most legal systems an anti-suit injunction ordered by an 
arbitral tribunal will be treated as a procedural order and will not be given the status of an 
arbitral award. This is so because an award is a final decision putting an end to an issue on the 
merits either in whole or in part. It may be a procedural matter but that usually requires that the 
decision of the tribunal would put an end to the proceedings such as a decision on the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal. See ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation of the 1958 New York 
Convention with assistance of the Permanent Court of Arbitration Peace Palace, The Hague 
(2011), 20 http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/1/13890217974630/judges_guide_english_composite_final_jan2014.pdf 
accessed on 10 July 2017. See also Cass Civ 1, October 12 2011, Groupe Antoine Tabet v 
République du Congo, Z 09-72.439. An anti-suit injunction does not perform such a function 
and it is often used in aid of the proceedings to assist in bringing the proceedings forward. This 
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Thus the Gazprom decision is a welcome step which confirms the EU’s commitment 
towards the protection of the system of international commercial arbitration.  Gazprom unlocks 
the potential use of procedural orders by a tribunal in protection of the arbitral proceedings,92 
supported by the power to issue a peremptory order, under certain national arbitration laws, if 
a party without showing sufficient cause, fails to comply with any order or directions of the 
tribunal.93 Moreover, if a claimant fails to comply with such order the tribunal may‘make such 
order as it thinks fit as to the payment of costs of the arbitration incurred in consequence of the 
non-compliance.’94  
However, we must issue a word of caution as to the actual impact that Gazprom will 
have. Firstly, the example of the interim award (anti-suit order) made by the tribunal can be 
challenged under Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention,95 or based on arbitrability or 
the public policy exception under Article V(2) of the same convention, as was suggested by 
                                                          
will have two repercussions with regards to the treatment of the anti-suit injunction. Firstly, it 
will not be possible to challenge its validity before the national court at the seat of arbitration. 
Secondly, procedural orders which do not finally resolve substantive rights of the parties will 
not be considered an ‘award’ under the system of the New York Convention and therefore will 
not benefit from its enforcement regime. See Braspetro Oil Servs co. V. Mgmt and 
Implementation Auth. Of the Greater Man-made River Project (Brasoil), XXIVa YBCA 296 
(1999).  
92 See for example s48(5) of the English Arbitration Act 1996 which states that a tribunal has 
the same powers as a national court to order a party to do or refrain from doing anything.  
93 S41(5) of the English Arbitration Act 1996. On the limits of peremptory orders see part 2 of 
CIARB Practice Guideline 14, ‘Practice Guideline 14: Guidelines for Arbitrators on how to 
approach an application for a Peremptory and ‘‘Unless’’ Orders and related matters’ 
https://www.ciarb.org/docs/default-source/practice-guidelines-protocols-and-rules/practice-
guidelines-relevant-to-the-english-arbitration-act-
1996/2011preemptoryandunlessorders.pdf?sfvrsn=6 accessed on 21 July 2016. 
94 S41(7)(d) of the English Arbitration Act 1996. 
95 Art V(1)(a) stipulates that a court can refuse recognition an enforcement of a New York 
Convention award if the ‘arbitration agreement was not valid under the law to which the parties 
subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award 
was made.’ 
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the Lithuanian Court of Appeal in Gazprom. 96   That very determination of whether the 
arbitration agreement is valid, is best resolved by the constituted arbitral tribunal in the first 
instance.97  
Secondly, one cannot ignore the fact that the CJEU reasoning was confined to a 
situation where the request of enforcement of the anti-suit order by the tribunal and the parallel 
court proceedings brought (allegedly) in breach of the arbitration agreement occurred within a 
single Member State (Lithuania). 98  Thus, a determination by that court in favour of 
enforcement of the arbitral award does not amount to interference with the right of a court of 
another Member State to determine its jurisdiction, and in turn does not constitute  a breach of 
the principle of mutual trust. However, what if the court seised with the request to enforce the 
arbitral award is not the same court seised with the parallel court proceedings allegedly brought 
in breach of the arbitration agreement? The old regime of Brussels I would have considered 
the matter as falling within the limits imposed by West Tankers and therefore would have 
declared it as incompatible with Brussels I. Our analysis however in Section E4 below of this 
paper demonstrates that this could no longer be a limitation on the court seised with the request 
to enforce the arbitral award, because of the changes brought by recital 12 and Article 73(2) of 
the recast Brussels I.99 Those changes give priority to the enforcement regime of the New York 
Convention over the application of Brussels I, including, in a broad sense giving priority over 
chapter II of Brussels I which deals with the jurisdiction of the courts.  
                                                          
96 Gazprom, supra n 5, para 21. It appears that Supreme Court of Lithuania recognised the 
interim award (anti-suit order issued by the tribunal), and refused to deny recognition and 
enforcement based on the grounds of non-arbitrability and public policy under Art V(2) of the 
New York Convention. See E Storskrubb, supra n 7, 585. 
97 Farah and Hourani, supra n 49. The court at the seat of arbitration could still be able to review 
the decision of the tribunal on the validity of the arbitration agreement. See for example Section 
31 of the English Arbitration Act 1996. 
98 See Gazprom, supra n 5, para 42. 
99 See the discussion on the irreconcilability between an award and a judgment in Section E4 
of this article. 
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3. Gazprom releases the potential for the use of measures restricting parallel court 
proceedings other than an anti-suit injunction 
Gazprom has released the potential for arbitral tribunals to protect the arbitral proceedings. 
This is a power, depending on the applicable arbitration law, that is widely given to the arbitral 
tribunal in order to safeguard efficiency of proceedings100 whilst at the same time balancing 
due process.101 For example, in the US,102 England,103 India,104 and Australia,105 to name but a 
few, tribunals are allowed to order interim measures. In France, as well as being able to order 
interim measures106 the arbitrators can order conservatory or provisional measures in the form 
of an interim award, which will enjoy enforcement in French courts, or possibly in other 
jurisdictions under the enforcement system of the New York Convention.107 China does not 
allow arbitrators to order interim measures, and therefore parties must approach Chinese courts 
for that purpose.108   
Moreover, in addition to the anti-suit relief which was the issue in Gazprom, the tribunal 
can order a party to pay damages for breach of the arbitration agreement, or can issue an 
                                                          
100 See Art 19 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, supra n 2. 
101 See ibid, Art 18. 
102 In the US following the decision in Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Europe, Ltd. v. Cont'l 
Cas. Co., 37 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 1994) arbitrators have the inherent power to order interim 
relief. Their enforceability by the courts depends on whether they have resolved a matter on 
the merits or that their enforcement is necessary to render a meaningful final award for example 
by securing assets.  
103 See s38(4) of the English Arbitration Act 1996. 
104 Art 17(1) of the Indian Arbitration Act 1996. 
105 See s17 of the CAA [Australia]. 
106 Art 1468 of the Code of Civil Procedure which applies to domestic arbitration, and Art 
1506(3) of the same Code which extends the application of Art 1468 to international arbitration. 
The arbitrator can order interim protective measures considered appropriate and attach 
penalties to them if deemed necessary. 
107  Under Art 1468(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure only courts are allowed to order 
conservatory attachments and judicial security. 
108 See Arts 26 and 48 of Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China. 
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indemnity order in an attempt to pre-empt a possible success of the parallel court action. It is 
important to note that the tribunal’s power to award damages for a breach of an arbitration 
agreement has the potential of being a powerful tool in defence of arbitral proceedings.109 The 
threat of the issuance of such an order acts as a raison d’être for parties not to bring proceedings 
before the national court in breach of the arbitration agreement. 
Until the decision of Gazprom it was not absolutely clear that an award ordering a party 
to pay damages for breach of the arbitration agreement would not be in conflict with Brussels 
I, and in turn the principle of effectiveness of EU law.110 For example, in West Tankers the 
tribunal was requested to make such orders by the English party which had contested the Italian 
court proceedings. Despite recognising that this was a matter which fell within its competence, 
the tribunal concluded that its power to make such awards was circumscribed by the decision 
in West Tankers.111  
The tribunal said that it was under a duty to apply Community Law. The tribunal stated 
that: 
the ruling by the European Court means that insurers have the right under European 
law to bring proceedings in Syracuse. Accordingly it seems to us that a decision by this 
tribunal that insurers did not have that right would be impossible to sustain if the matter 
were tested again before the European Court. A competition between the right upheld 
by the European court and the right to damages would, in the present state of 
                                                          
109 Fierens and Volders, supra n 15, 94-95.  
110 See Raphael, supra n 45, para 12.40 that it is unclear whether the reasoning in West Tankers 
could preclude the award of damages for breach of an exclusive choice of court agreement. 
The author though is inclined in favour of the argument that such measures could survive the 
scrutiny of the principle of mutual trust.  
111 Para 77 of the tribunal as cited by Flaux J in West Tankers Inc v Allianz SPA [2012] EWHC 
854 (Comm), [2012] 2 Lloyd's Rep 103. 
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Community law, result in a victory for the former. And this is so despite the specific 
provision in Article 1(2)(d).112 
West Tankers appealed the decision of the tribunal to the English High Court, England being 
the seat of arbitration, under section 69 of the English Arbitration Act 1996.113 The Court 
allowed the appeal and held that: ‘whilst the tribunal was bound to apply European law as part 
of English law, the tribunal would only have to apply the principle of effective judicial 
protection if it were engaged, which it was not.’114 The English High Court therefore reasoned 
that the principle of effectiveness is not a free-standing principle and EU law must be engaged 
first before it is possible to deem a national measure incompatible with that law.115  
Gazprom reinforced the decision of the English High Court, firstly, by stating 
unequivocally that tribunals are not bound by the principle of mutual trust, and secondly, 
despite not saying so expressly, that the principle of effectiveness does not apply where the 
situation is confined to a single Member State. Therefore, in such situations such requests are 
subject to the application of national law, and its approach on the enforcement mechanism of 
the New York Convention. We will see in E3 that Article 73(2) of the Recast Brussels I has 
the effect of allowing the application of the New York Convention even where such application 
would otherwise be in conflict with that Regulation. 
E. The Recast Brussels I Regulation (Recast Brussels I) 
While Brussels I does not impose an outright obligation on national courts to restrict parallel 
proceedings, the recast Brussels I certainly provides more support for international commercial 
                                                          
112 Ibid. 
113 S69 of the English Arbitration Act 1996. This is appeal is only allowed by the permission 
of the court and is only possible under tightly controlled conditions.  
114 Para 64 of [2005] 2 All ER (Comm) 240, 253. 
115 See ibid. 
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arbitration. It does this by relaxing the principle of mutual trust in certain situations, by 
restricting the application of the principle of effectiveness of EU law, and by giving priority to 
the New York Convention 1958. With this last measure it gives more scope to national courts 
to restrict Parallel Proceedings.  
In order to fully appreciate the change brought about by the recast Brussels I, it is 
important to understand the legislative intention behind recital 12, which can be discerned from 
the preparatory work of the recast Brussels I. We shall also outline the amendments which have 
been introduced in Article 73(2) of Brussels I in so far as these affect the analysis. 
 
1. Preparatory work of Recast Brussels I 
The European Union Commission engaged in wide consultation with various stakeholders 
regarding the relationship between Brussels I and arbitration. The process included a green 
paper116 and numerous communications between EU institutions highlighting in part that a 
solution must be found to the situation that was experienced in West Tankers. 117  The 
Commission found that many stakeholders were in favour of further action to be taken by the 
EU in order to avoid parallel proceedings between courts and arbitration, and ”abusive 
litigation tactics.” However, views diverged among stakeholders of whether the proper solution 
should be made through the exclusion of arbitration ”more broadly from the scope of the 
Regulation,” 118  or whether concrete substantive revisions should be included so as to 
                                                          
116 Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation (EC) No.44/2001 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Com/2009/0175 
final). 
117 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament And of the Council on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast) 
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118 Ibid, para 2. 
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harmonise national law approaches to parallel proceedings between court litigation and 
arbitration. 
The EU Commission endorsed the latter view and recommended the addition to 
Brussels I with a new Article 29(4): 
Where the agreed or designated seat of an arbitration is in a Member State, the courts 
of another Member State whose jurisdiction is contested on the basis of an arbitration 
agreement shall stay proceedings once the courts of the Member State where the seat 
of the arbitration is located or the arbitral tribunal have been seised of proceedings to 
determine, as their main object or as an incidental question, the existence, validity or 
effects of that arbitration agreement. 119 
The Council of the EU rejected the proposed addition. Instead, the final version placed 
emphasis on reforms to the recitals of Brussels I. This was also the view of the European 
Parliament which strongly rejected including a solution to the problem of parallel proceedings 
in Brussels I (recast),120 which in effect would have meant a partial abolition of the exclusion 
of arbitration from the scope of Brussels I.  The European Parliament took account of the 
diversity in approach found under national law to parallel proceedings. This diversity is present 
among national laws despite an increasing movement towards internationalisation of 
arbitration through permissive reading of national law, international harmonisation, and often 
through a process of delocalisation.121 A more interventionist approach by Brussels I in the 
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relationship between court proceedings and arbitral proceedings could be seen as an 
unwelcome interference with Member States’ legislative space that is demonstrably diverse on 
the issue of parallel proceedings between courts and arbitration, and which seeks to influence 
international arbitration beyond the EU. The European Parliament found that forcing a 
harmonised solution on Member States, where Member States have not reached a common 
position on the matter, could prove to be counter-effective.122Instead, notable changes were 
introduced to the recitals limiting the scope of Brussels I in situations concerning arbitration. 
Furthermore, no changes were made to Article 1(2)(d) of Brussels I.  
 
2. West Tankers conforms to the CJEU’s earlier jurisprudence 
AG Wathelet in Gazprom attacked the reasoning in West Tankers based on two key 
submissions. Firstly, that recital 12 of the recast Brussels I has the effect of excluding from the 
scope of Brussels I, court proceedings in which the validity of the arbitration agreement was 
contested.123 AG Wathelet relied on the language of recital 12 (2) which states that: 
A ruling given by a court of a Member State as to whether or not an arbitration 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed should not be 
subject to the rules of recognition and enforcement laid down in this Regulation, 
regardless of whether the court decided on this as a principal issue or as an incidental 
question. 
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 In his view, the non-italicised passage above removes proceedings concerning the validity of 
the arbitration agreement, even as an incidental matter, from the scope of the recast Brussels I. 
In such a way, an anti-suit injunction issued by a court of a Member State ordering parties to 
stop proceedings before a court of another Member State would not be seen as contrary to the 
principle of effectiveness of EU law.124  
Secondly, that West Tankers’ reasoning was wrong and did not comply with previous 
CJEU decisions, namely Hoffmann125 and Rich.126 Hoffmann concerned the enforcement of a 
German judgment before a Dutch court ordering a husband to pay monthly maintenance 
payments to his wife. The husband claimed that the German judgment was irreconcilable with 
an earlier Dutch judgment which had dissolved the marriage, a matter which fell outside the 
scope of Brussels I.127 In a preliminary reference to the CJEU it was asked, inter alia, to: 
establish whether a foreign judgment whose enforcement has been ordered in a 
Contracting State pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention must continue to be enforced 
in all cases in which it would still be enforceable in the State in which it was given even 
when, under the law of the State in which enforcement is sought, the judgment ceases 
to be enforceable for reasons which lie outside the scope of the Convention.128  
As stated above, the judgment ceased to be enforceable in the Netherlands because the marriage 
had been dissolved by a judgment of the Dutch court in a dispute between the same parties.129 
The CJEU held that the Dutch court seised with the request of recognition and enforcement 
was entitled under Article 27(3) of the Brussels Convention to take into account the divorce 
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decree, which had undermined the presupposed marriage relationship between the husband and 
wife, and accordingly, to refuse recognition and enforcement.130 This was possible because the 
Convention judgment was deemed to be in conflict with a national rule concerning the status 
of a natural person.131 Equally the court found that under Article 27(4) of the Convention the 
seised court could refuse recognition and enforcement of a Convention judgment which was 
irreconcilable with a national judgment. The CJEU stated that: 
 the judgments at issue have legal consequences which are mutually exclusive. The 
foreign judgment, which necessarily presupposes the existence of the matrimonial 
relationship, would have to be enforced although that relationship has been dissolved 
by a judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in the state in which 
enforcement is sought.132 
The AG reasoned that in the judgment of West Tankers: 
although arbitration, like the status of natural persons, was excluded from the scope of 
the Brussels I Regulation, the Court held that the English courts could not apply their 
national law to its full extent and issue anti-suit injunctions in support of an arbitration. 
In doing so, the Court restricted the extent to which arbitration is excluded from the 
scope of that regulation.133 
It is argued here that the decision in West Tankers can be distinguished from the Hoffmann 
decision in fact and in law. The main proceedings in Hoffmann were triggered as a result of 
irreconcilability between a national judgment and a Regulation judgment before the same 
national court. The effectiveness of the Brussels Regulation therefore was not constrained in 
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anyway because the solution to the irreconcilability, unlike the anti-suit injunction in West 
Tankers, was founded on the application of Brussels I, i.e. Brussels I was applicable under the 
old articles 27(3) and 27(4) and formed an important part of the court’s reasoning. 
In relation to Rich, AG Wathelet contended that Rich demands that the scope of 
Brussels I be assessed in relation to the subject matter of the dispute in the main proceedings.134 
AG Wathelet then went on to say that the court in West Tankers instead of examining the 
subject-matter of the dispute in the main proceedings, examined it in the light of another 
dispute, namely the dispute brought before the Italian courts and by that departed from its 
approach in Rich.135  
The above assessment of Rich does not pay close attention to the main question which 
was put before the CJEU. In Rich the claimant brought proceedings before the London High 
Court requesting the court to appoint an arbitrator in accordance with the English Arbitration 
Act. The respondent challenged the validity of the arbitration agreement as a preliminary matter 
before that court.  Therefore, in Rich the emphasis was on the treatment of a preliminary issue 
concerning the validity of the arbitration agreement in London court proceedings principally 
concerned with the appointment of an arbitrator. Rich reasoned that when assessing the scope 
of the Brussels Convention reference should be made solely to the subject-matter of the 
dispute.136  
In West Tankers the subject matter in the main proceedings before the Italian court was 
brought in tort, namely whether the ship owner was liable to pay damages to the subrogated 
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insurer as a result of their tortious conduct which had occurred in Italy. Article 1(2)(d) on the 
other hand ”extends to judicial proceedings whose principal subject matter is arbitration… 
regardless of any preliminary issue involved in the proceedings.”137 Therefore, in West Tankers 
the Italian proceedings fell within the scope of the Regulation. This was the primary reason 
which triggered the application of the principle of effectiveness, regardless of whether or not 
the London proceedings fell outside the scope of the Regulation. Therefore, there was nothing 
in the West Tankers’ reasoning that departed from the approach in Rich. West Tankers simply 
developed the decision in Rich taking into account the proceedings before the Italian courts.  
 
3. No express repeal of West Tankers in Recital 12  
It is important to emphasise that the CJEU in Gazprom neither supported nor rejected AG 
Wathelet’s opinion that the recast Brussels I has challenged the reasoning of West Tankers.138 
Contrary to the submission of AG Wathelet in Gazprom, the recast Brussels I does not alter the 
reasoning in West Tankers.  Recital 12 reiterates that Brussels I ‘should not’ apply to 
arbitration. However, it clarifies that proceedings such as those which were brought before the 
Italian court in West Tankers are not removed from the scope of Brussels I by virtue of the 
exclusion of arbitration, namely, that nothing prevents: 
courts of a Member State, when seised of an action in a matter in respect of which the 
parties have entered into an arbitration agreement, from referring the parties to 
arbitration, from staying or dismissing the proceedings, or from examining whether the 
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arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, in 
accordance with their national law.139  
Given that no amendments have been made to Article 1(2)(d) of the original text of Brussels I 
and particularly because the Council of the EU rejected the proposed amendments by the 
Commission which would have brought arbitration partially into the scope of Brussels I by 
giving priority to the seat of arbitration, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the 
reasoning in West Tankers has survived the reforms made in the recast Brussels I.140 However, 
it will be shown in E4 and 5 that important obstacles which had stood in the way of the 
protection of international commercial arbitration have now been removed by the recast 
Brussels I. 
 
4. Recital 12(2) does not have the effect of reversing the West Tankers decision  
Perhaps the most explicit change to Brussels I brought about by recital 12 of Brussels I recast 
relates to the enforceability of a judgment determining the validity of an arbitration agreement. 
Recital 12 states that: 
A ruling given by a court of a Member State as to whether or not an arbitration 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed should not be 
subject to the rules of recognition and enforcement laid down in this Regulation, 
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regardless of whether the court decided on this as a principal issue or as an incidental 
question.141 
AG Wathelet contended that the effect of Recital 12(2) was to remove proceedings concerning 
the validity of the arbitration agreement from the scope of Brussels I, and by doing so it allowed 
a court of a Member State to issue an anti-suit injunction ordering a party to stop proceedings 
before another court of a Member State. The authors submit here that recital 12 does not have 
such an effect with regards to anti-suit injunctions issued by a Member State court. 142  
The reader should be reminded that recitals do not have the status of law under EU 
law.143 They do however provide an interpretive aid for the CJEU to understand the legislative 
intention behind the legal provision. Recital 12 firmly stipulates that Member States are not 
obliged to recognise or enforce judgments by courts of other Member States which determine 
the validity of an arbitration agreement. The reader should also pay attention to the historical 
context of recital 12(2), which was introduced in order to address the type of situation in 
National Navigation v Endesa (Wadi Sudr). The central issue in Wadi Sudr was whether a 
decision by a Spanish court that an arbitration agreement was not binding on the parties, and 
which was not a judgment on the merits, should be treated as a Regulation judgment, and 
therefore enjoy the enforcement provisions of Brussels I.144 A decision in the affirmative would 
have brought to an end the arbitral proceedings in London. The Court of Appeal in Wadi Sudr, 
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relying on the decision of the CJEU in West Tankers, ruled that since the main proceedings in 
Spain concerned a matter that fell within the scope of the Regulation, a judgment on the 
applicability of the arbitration agreement in the same proceedings should be treated as a 
Regulation judgment.145  
An important practical effect of recital 12(2) is that arbitral proceedings that have 
commenced could continue despite the validity of the arbitration agreement being scrutinised 
by a national court. This brings Brussels I into conformity with acceptable international 
practice as outlined by Article 8 (ii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law.146 According to this 
Article, the party relying on the arbitration agreement can proceed with the arbitration, in the 
knowledge that any adverse decision on the validity of the arbitration agreement by a court of 
a Member State delivered in the parallel proceedings will not enjoy the enforcement regime of 
Brussels I.  
As a matter of practice parties who resist the parallel court proceedings are often 
advised by their legal advisors to commence arbitral proceedings at the seat of arbitration. 
Despite the risk of increasing costs, the consolation is that more often than not the arbitral 
proceedings will conclude long before the court litigation does. Moreover, the choice of an 
experienced seat of arbitration should be in principle supportive of the arbitration agreement. 
This decision can then have greater force if the objection to the jurisdiction of the tribunal is 
heard firstly by the arbitral tribunal, or alternatively by a court at the seat of arbitration. The 
latter is usually more procedurally efficient than the court dealing with the validity of the 
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arbitration agreement as an incidental matter to the main proceedings, (as evidenced in the 
Italian proceedings in West Tankers).  
5 The irreconcilability between an award and a judgment 
 
The discussion above shows that Brussels I does not contain a specific solution to parallel 
proceedings between court litigation and arbitration in its text. The problem is that a court of a 
Member State may decide that the arbitration agreement is invalid and proceed to make a 
decision on the merits, which is within its right under Article II of the New York Convention.147 
In the meantime a tribunal may continue with the parallel proceedings and deliver a conflicting 
award on the same subject matter. Therefore, there is a possibility, at least in theory, that an 
irreconcilability between an arbitral award and a court judgment could occur, which would 
bring a host of problems at the time of recognition and enforcement of the Regulation judgment 
and the arbitral award. That, for obvious reasons, has the potential to diminish the value of the 
judgment as well as the value of the arbitral award. Neither the original Brussels I Regulation, 
nor the New York Convention, contains a solution to this problem in its text.  
There are a number of possible answers to this conundrum. It is possible to argue that 
the national court will favour the arbitral award and engage the public policy exception in 
Brussels I, which stipulates that a Member State shall refuse recognition of a Regulation 
judgment “if such recognition is manifestly contrary to the public policy in the Member State 
addressed.”148  This is made more compelling when viewed from the prism of the principle of 
res judicata, which in relation to an arbitral award delivered before a Regulation judgment may 
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create an issue of preclusion before the national court during the recognition proceedings of 
the Regulation judgment.149  
Having said that it is difficult to see how the public policy exception could operate in 
the context of irreconcilability between a Regulation judgment and an arbitral award. Firstly, 
Articles 45(1)(a) and 46 of Brussels I which allow for derogation from the enforcement system 
under Brussels I have been applied restrictively. The CJEU stressed that the public policy 
exception ‘should operate only in exceptional circumstances, and the limits of the concept are 
a matter for interpretation of the Regulation, to be determined by the European Court’.150 For 
example, the English Court of Appeal in the Wadi Sudr, discussed above, refused to apply the 
public policy exception to a Spanish judgment which determined that the arbitration agreement 
was not incorporated in the contract, despite being contrary to the English law position on the 
matter.151 Moore-Bick LJ stated in the Wadi Sudr:  
In my view, however much importance is attached to arbitration, or even to the principle 
that contracts are to be performed, it cannot be said that the failure on the part of the 
Spanish court in good faith to give effect in this case to an arbitration agreement 
imperfectly spelled out in the bill of lading (but in the eyes of English law sufficiently 
incorporated by reference) would involve a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded 
as essential in the legal order of the United Kingdom or of a right recognised as being 
fundamental within that legal order.152  
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Secondly, when considering the main role of the doctrine of res judicata we begin to 
see why it is unlikely to trigger the operation of the public policy exception. The principle of 
res judicata is often used in order to prevent the relitigation of the same cause of action between 
the same parties, primarily before the court, and the arbitral tribunal.  It is uncommon for it to 
be used in the context of irreconcilability between an arbitral award and a court judgment.153 
Moreover, the operation of the doctrine itself is highly dependent on domestic law, which 
makes it less conducive to uniformity and certainty. It is difficult to ascertain who is bound by 
the res judicata effect of an arbitral award and when the award becomes res judicata, and 
whether it depends on it being enforced.154 
  As seen in the analysis above the public policy exception found under Articles 45 and 
46 does not offer a convincing answer to the problem of irreconcilability of an arbitral award 
and a Regulation judgment. Going back to the illustration in the introduction, the French court, 
faced with such irreconcilability would have to have come up with an answer; either to enforce 
the arbitral award or to enforce the Regulation judgment.  In the forthcoming analysis it is 
submitted that the recast Brussels I contains a solution to this problem under Article 73(2).    
(a) The Recast Brussels I offers a solution  
Recital 12(3) of the Regulation stipulates that where a court of a Member State considers an 
arbitration agreement to be void, voidable, inoperative or incapable of being performed and 
delivers a judgment on the merits, that judgment could continue to enjoy the enforcement 
provisions of Brussels I, save where this prejudices a court of a Member State from enforcing 
an arbitral award under the New York Convention.155The only possible situation where the 
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second part of this recital 12(3) will be of relevance is where the arbitral award creates a 
material conflict with the Regulation judgment. Recital 12 envisages, therefore, a situation 
where the enforcement of a Regulation judgment will compromise the effectiveness of the 
enforcement regime of New York Convention 1958. Recital 12 does not establish a precedence 
of the arbitral award over the conflicting Regulation judgment.156 Instead recital 12 gives the 
green light to a court of a Member State to favour the arbitral award without risking being in 
breach of the principle of effectiveness of EU law.  
The recast Regulation includes a solution in its text under Article 73(2) which stipulates 
that the Regulation ‘shall not affect’ the application of the New York Convention. This could 
only be understood as meaning that the Member State has no discretion whether or not to 
enforce the arbitral award under the Regulation, other than on grounds allowed under the New 
York Convention. Therefore Article 73(2) demands that the enforcement regime of the New 
York Convention be applied first.157  
There are two reasons that make the above interpretation correct. The first is based on 
a literal interpretation of Article 73(2) which, unlike its predecessor under Brussels I [Art. 
71(1)], makes an express reference to the New York Convention 158 . It states that “This 
Regulation shall not affect the application of the 1958 New York Convention” [bold added]. A 
Member State that prefers the Brussels I judgment over a conflicting arbitral award such as in 
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the example we make above will no doubt ‘affect’ the application of the New York Convention. 
Therefore, we conclude that Article 73(2) demands that the enforcement regime of the New 
York Convention be applied first. In a way this proposed application of Article 73(2) has a 
similar effect to the principle of effectiveness discussed above in D,  and supported by the 
rationale of recital 12 (3). However, on this occasion it is EU law that has to give heed to the 
New York Convention. It is important to emphasise that it is not a question of primacy of the 
New York Convention over Brussels I so much as it is about giving effect to the New York 
Convention.  
     The second reason is based on a teleological interpretation.  It is important to be reminded 
that according to settled case-law when: 
interpreting a provision of European Union law it is necessary to consider not only its 
wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules 
of which it is part.159 
Therefore in addition to the wording of Article 73(2) account should be given to its objective, 
the context in which it occurs, and the objectives pursued by the recast Brussels I.160  In order 
to discover the objectives of Article 73(2) regard must be given to recital 12(3), which clearly 
preserves the New York Convention enforcement regime vis-a-vis Brussels I. For the first time 
in the history of Brussels I there is a clear reference to the precedence of the New York 
Convention. It is not far-fetched then to argue that one of the objectives of Article 73(2) is to 
consolidate the precedence of the New York Convention envisaged in the recitals and make 
sure that the enforcement regime of the New York Convention is preserved. Furthermore, the 
Heidelberg report, which preceded the reforms of Brussels I, demonstrated that there is not 
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much appetite among Member States to accept a situation where the effectiveness of the New 
York Convention is undermined by Brussels I or any other regional treaty for that matter.161   
This is also a pragmatic solution for the issue at hand. The above analysis would have 
the effect of suspending the decision on whether or not to enforce the Regulation judgment. At 
the same time it is perfectly plausible that a court seised with the request of recognition and 
enforcement, would refuse recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award under any of the 
available grounds of challenge to recognition and enforcement found in Article V of the New 
York Convention; for example, by finding that the arbitration agreement is void, or because 
enforcement of the arbitral award contravenes public policy. 162  This is also a rational 
conclusion because a decision to enforce the arbitral award means that the original court, which 
was seised on the subject matter, most likely did so by ignoring a valid arbitration agreement, 
or by erroneously deciding that the agreement was invalid. It is pertinent to point out that such 
a wrong assertion of jurisdiction may be considered in some Member States as being in breach 
of public policy, and therefore would be refused recognition and enforcement under Brussels 
I.163   
We should also accept the above analysis based on policy considerations. Firstly, this 
solution will mitigate the inefficiencies resulting from West Tankers by providing a 
disincentive to disputants to pursue a court action in breach of an arbitration agreement.  
Secondly, the above proposed interpretation of Article 73(2) could preserve the integrity of the 
Regulation judgment, where the court finds that one of the grounds in Article V of the New 
York Convention is satisfied.164 The authors acknowledge that giving such an application to 
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Article 73(2) may weaken the free movement of judgments among Member States. It may 
further be the case that the principle of mutual trust which is so important to the system of 
Brussels I is prima facie compromised. In defence however it is submitted that since the given 
solution resides in Brussels I, this challenge to the above principles should be accepted when 
considering how important it is to the EU and Member States to preserve the integrity and 
uniformity of the New York Convention.  
Finally, the above analysis should apply to any conflict between the enforcement of an 
arbitral award under New York Convention and Brussels I.  It should extend to a conflict 
between an arbitral award and part II of Brussels I which covers jurisdiction rules. Therefore 
where a court of a Member State is seised with a request, say for example, the enforcement of 
an award containing a monetary relief resulting from a breach of the arbitration agreement, this 
should not be in conflict with the principle of effectiveness of EU law if by doing so it indirectly 
affects the jurisdiction of a court of another Member State which has seised jurisdiction under 
Brussels I. There is a general consensus in favour of relaxing the application of the principle 
of effectiveness where an interface occurs between arbitration and Brussels I, and this reading 
of the situation allows further movement in that direction. 
Whether we accept or reject the analysis above it is important to recognise that a more 
explicit solution to the problem of irreconcilability between a judgment and an arbitral award 
should be placed high on the EU Commission’s agenda during the next round of reform of the 
Brussels I.  
F. Conclusion  
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This article demonstrates that the system of Brussels I does not offer an express solution in its 
text that prevents the occurrence of parallel proceedings. Furthermore, this article casts serious 
doubt about the submissions made by AG Wathelet in the Gazprom case attacking the 
conformity of West Tankers with earlier jurisprudence of the CJEU. It also demonstrates that 
West Tankers reasoning is very likely to survive despite the changes brought about by recital 
12 of the recast Brussels I.   
However, it is shown that the competing policies; those prevailing in the system of 
international commercial arbitration on the one hand, and those supporting the system of 
Brussels I on the other hand, have now been brought into greater harmony under the recast 
Brussels I. It was made clear that there have been notable reforms to the system of Brussels I 
that assist in organising the interface between arbitration and Brussels I, in a way which pushes 
forward the interests of international commercial arbitration. For example, by removing the 
enforcement of a judgment on the validity of the arbitral award from the enforcement regime 
of Brussels I, or by favouring the New York Convention enforcement regime over Brussels I 
in a situation of irreconcilability between an arbitral award and a Regulation judgment; or by 
limiting the obligation to respect the principle of mutual trust to courts of Member States as 
opposed to arbitral tribunals such as in the case of Gazprom; or by upholding a decision of an 
arbitral body to the effect that the party taking parallel court action is in breach of the arbitration 
agreement, and (in cases of irreconcilability between the arbitral award and a parallel court 
award), giving primacy to the arbitral award and enabling a national court to enforce such an 
order.   
Whilst this does not bring to an end abusive parallel proceedings, the recast Brussels I 
(by its revisions to the original Brussels I), and Gazprom (by its interpretation of key non-
revised parts of Brussels I), do certainly provide more support for international commercial 
arbitration by giving more scope to national courts to restrict parallel proceedings. As a result, 
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there are now further disincentives to the use of parallel proceedings. This should also help to 
consolidate the EU’s commitment to preserving the integrity of the New York Convention 
regime.  
 
 
